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DISQUALIFICATION OF COMPANY DIRECTORS: SAFEGUARDING 
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE KENYAN INVESTMENT MARKET 
Kiarie Mwaura* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two decades, Africa has gone through tremendous 
economic transformation. It was only in 2004 when the Prime Minister for 
the United Kingdom, Tony Blair, described Africa as the “scar on the 
conscience of the world” when he was establishing the Commission for 
Africa.1 A decade later, he described Africa as “the most exciting continent 
on the planet because of its opportunities.”2 Within less than twenty years, 
the continent has become the world’s most rapidly growing economic region. 
This economic growth has been attributed largely to the active private sector. 
Kenya, for example, has realized the highest growth rate in the East African 
region due to its private sector, which makes a major contribution to the 
country’s GDP.3 For this growth rate to continue, African countries need to 
create competitive legal frameworks that continue to attract investors and 
protect their interests. 
One example is the disqualification framework for company directors 
which seeks to protect the public by placing a prohibition on a miscreant 
director from being involved, for a specific period, in the management of 
companies.4 An efficient disqualification framework also prevents people 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Dean & Professor of Corporate Law, School of Law, University of Nairobi; Advocate of the High 
Court of Kenya; mwaura.advocate@gmail.com. 
1 See Tony Blair, Africa is the Most Exciting Continent on the Planet, TONY BLAIR INST. FOR 
GLOBAL CHANGE (Apr. 29, 2015), https://institute.global/insight/governance/africa-most-exciting-
continent-planet. 
2 Id. 
3 See Ease of Doing Business Survey Kenya, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.doingbusiness 
.org/data/exploreeconomies/kenya (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
4 STEPHEN GRIFFIN, PERSONAL LIABILITY AND DISQUALIFICATION OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 131 
(1999). 
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without the necessary qualifications from managing companies, and deters 
those who might be tempted to engage in fraudulent activities.5 Investors are 
unlikely to be attracted to a country without a strict disqualification 
framework because they risk losing their investments when their companies 
are managed by incompetent, negligent, and/or fraudulent directors, 
especially by those with a track record of mismanaging companies. This 
philosophy was captured clearly by the Kenyan Government when it enacted 
the Companies Act 2015, which stated that one of its key objectives was to 
facilitate commerce, industry, and other socio-economic activities.6 It is 
against this backdrop that this Article examines whether the disqualification 
framework under the Companies Act 2015 is adequate to protect investors’ 
interests. This framework is then contrasted with the one that existed under 
the repealed Companies Act 1962 in order to assess whether the reforms are 
likely to bring about the desired changes. 
II. GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION 
The repealed Companies Act 1962 required directors to cease serving 
as directors in the event that they failed to take up any prescribed shares 
within two months of their appointment.7 It also provided that a director 
would become automatically disqualified if he was declared bankrupt or 
made any arrangement or composition with his creditors.8 Other grounds for 
disqualification of directors, included: whether he was prohibited from being 
a director by reason of fraud;9 where a director was of unsound mind;10 where 
he resigned his office by notice in writing to the company;11 or he was absent 
for more than six months without permission of the directors from meetings 
with the directors held during that period.12 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 R v. Kazmi (1984) 7 Cr. App. R. 115, 116. 
6 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 2. 
7 The Companies Act (1962) Cap. 486 § 183 (Kenya). 
8 Id. § 188(1). 
9 Id. § 189(1)(b)(ii). 
10 Id. at tbl.A § 88(d). 
11 Id. at tbl.A § 88(e). 
12 Id. at tbl.A § 88(f). 
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A. Bankrupts 
Persons who were undischarged bankrupts were barred from acting as 
directors under the Companies Act 1962.13 As people who had failed to 
manage their finances, bankrupt individuals were automatically disqualified 
from taking part in the management of companies. As such, their 
disqualification was not dependent upon wrongdoing, negligence, or the 
making of a disqualification order by the court. However, they were entitled 
to apply to court for leave to act as a director.14 For leave to be granted, the 
bankrupt needed to show that he or she could be safely involved in the 
management of companies.15 
Acting as a director whilst disqualified resulted in criminal penalties16 
and personal liability for the debts and other liabilities of any company in 
whose management a disqualified person was involved.17 The personal 
liability extended to any person involved in the management of the company 
who knowingly acted on the instructions of a disqualified person.18 
Disqualifying bankrupt persons from managing companies was helpful in 
protecting the interests of shareholders and creditors. 
Similar to the Companies Act 1962, bankrupt individuals are 
disqualified from being involved in the management of companies under the 
Companies Act 2015. Thusly, it is an offense for an undischarged bankrupt 
to directly or indirectly participate in the promotion, formation or 
management of a company.19 
B. Fraud and the Management of a Company 
The Companies Act 1962 provided for disqualification of directors on 
the basis of fraud. A court could disqualify20 a person from taking part in the 
management of a company if the person was “convicted of any offence in 
                                                                                                                           
 
13 Id. § 188(1). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. § 188(2). 
16 Id. § 188(1). 
17 See id. § 323(1)(a). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. §§ 223(1), (4). 
20 See Andrew Hicks, Making and Resisting Disqualification Orders, 8 CO. L. 243 (1987). 
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connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company.”21 
A person could also have been disqualified if, in the course of winding up of 
a company, it appeared that he, while an officer of the company, had been 
guilty “of any fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of his duty 
to the company.”22 
This provision was thought to have been narrow in scope, as it only 
covered offences that were connected with the promotion, formation, and 
management of the company. It did not extend to other offences, such as 
economic crimes, which could also make a director unsuitable to serve. 
The provision was also somewhat vague, as it extended liability to a 
wide range of persons, including employees in the lower cadre of the 
company, who often get involved in the indirect management of a company. 
As a result, this made it difficult for a disqualified person to ascertain what 
role he ought to have assumed once employed by a company.23 For example, 
since the concept of management involves policy-making and decision-
making activities which affect the company as a whole, or a substantial part 
of it, and which may affect its financial standing,24 a management consultant 
advising on financial management could have been said to be concerned in 
the management of the company for the purposes of disqualification.25 As a 
result of this, full disqualification posed the risk of not only removing a 
person from the board,26 but also making him unemployable.27 
This ground was also thought to be limited, as it did not allow for 
disqualification of directors on the grounds of breach of duty when a 
company was a going concern. Disqualification for breach of duty was only 
triggered when a company was in the process of being wound up. Therefore, 
this meant that many miscreant directors who had breached their duties 
escaped liability, especially when it was difficult to prove fraud when a 
company was a going concern. The difficulty in proving fraud was illustrated 
in the case of Kassam Ebrahim v. Tait,28 where the Chief Judge Sir Charles 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 See The Companies Act (1962) Cap. 486 § 189(1) (Kenya). 
22 Id. § 189(1)(b)(ii). 
23 Re Altim Pty Ltd [1968] 2 NSWLR 762 (Austl.). 
24 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v. Bracht [1989] V.R. 821 (Austl.). 
25 R. v. Campbell (Mary) [1984] BCLC 83 (Eng.). 
26 See Companies Code Act 179 of 1963 § 186(1)(b) (Ghana). 
27 L.H. Leigh, Disqualification Orders in Company and Insolvency Law, 7 CO. L. 179, 183 (1986). 
28 Kassam Ebrahim v. Tait (1935) CA 2 (Eastern Afr.). 
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Law followed the judgment of Lord Halsbury in Ex parte Barnes29 to hold 
that “facts must be found . . . against the person incriminated and that there 
must be an individual person incriminated . . . it is not enough that there is a 
general finding that fraud must have existed somewhere, which would mean 
nothing.”30 As a result of the onerous burden of proving fraud in Kenya, the 
disqualification regime was largely ineffective in deterring misconduct on 
the part of directors. 
The obstacle of proving fraud has now been removed by Sections 214 
and 216 of the Companies Act 2015, which allows for disqualification on the 
grounds of fraud and breach of duty.31 The disqualification under Section 214 
extends to the misconduct of a director when a company is a going concern. 
Section 214 is similar to Section 8 of the UK’s Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA), which allows for disqualification of a 
director for being unfit when the company is a going concern.32 
For a director to be declared unfit under Section 214, the court must be 
satisfied that the director has exhibited gross incompetence or conduct in 
breach of commercial morality that constitutes a danger to the public.33 This 
may arise, for instance, where a director conducts business in total disregard 
of the interests of creditors. In Re Ipcon Fashions Ltd,34 knowledge by the 
director that the company was insolvent when he siphoned off its business to 
another company, thus incurring liability to the old company, was held to be 
a ground for disqualification. Similarly, in Re McNulty’s Interchange Ltd,35 
a director who had no new ideas about improving the business of a company, 
which was continuously accumulating debts, was liable for disqualification.36 
                                                                                                                           
 
29 Ex parte Barnes [1896] AC 146 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
30 Id. at 152. 
31 See The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 214(4) 
(providing that “disqualification order may be made on grounds that are or include matters other than 
criminal convictions, whether or not the person in respect of whom it is to be made may be criminally 
liable in respect of those matters”). 
32 Company Directors Disqualification Act, 1986, c. 46, § 8 (U.K.). 
33 Dawson Print Group Ltd [1987] 3 BCC 322 (Eng.). See also Andrew Hicks, Disqualification of 
Directors-Forty Years On, J. BUS. L., 1988, at 27, 42. 
34 Re Ipcon Fasions Ltd [1989] 5 BCC 733 (Eng.). 
35 Re McNulty’s Interchange Ltd [1988] 4 BCC 533 (Eng.). 
36 See also Re Douglas Construction [1988] 4 BCC 553 (Eng.) (holding that the director, who had 
put a lot of his own money into the company in order to keep it going, was held not to have contravened 
the principles of business morality); Dawson Print Group Ltd [1987] 3 BCC 322 (Eng.) (finding a director 
not liable for failing to pay debts due to the Crown and continuing to trade when he ought to have known 
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As to what makes a person unfit in the United Kingdom, Browne Wilkinson 
VC provides a meaningful explanation, “Ordinary commercial misjudgement 
is in itself not sufficient to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the 
conduct complained of must display a lack of commercial probity although I 
have no doubt that in an extreme case of gross negligence or total 
incompetence disqualification could be appropriate.”37 
Therefore, courts have refused to disqualify directors for mere 
mismanagement, as the aim of disqualification is to protect the public and 
not punishment of directors.38 It follows that despite the mandatory nature of 
Section 214 of the Companies Act 2015, courts may decline to disqualify a 
director in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove unfitness.39 
Furthermore, while the courts assess whether a director should be 
disqualified on the balance of probabilities, the amount of evidence required 
to find a director liable is often more onerous than that,40 extending the 
standards of proof beyond the civil one. Given that the application of the 
balance of probabilities test would lead to disqualification of many directors, 
the onerous standard of proof is thus applied in favour of directors to ensure 
that they continue to run companies where risk is not apparent.41 
Section 214 makes the disqualification regime more stringent, as a 
company does not have to be in the course of winding up for the unfitness 
ground to be applied. The unfitness ground introduces a desirable application 
of objective standards,42 such as breach of commercial morality, gross 
                                                                                                                           
 
that the company was insolvent). Contra Re Stanford Services Ltd [1987] 3 BCC 326 (Eng.) (rendering 
the commercial test unhelpful and disqualified a director for two years for using money collected as VAT 
or PAYE as part of their cash flow needs). 
37 Re Lo Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 4 BCC 415 at 419 (Eng.). 
38 Re Grayan Building Services Ltd [1995] BCC 554 at 557 (Eng.). 
39 Re Arctic Engineering Ltd (No. 2) [1985] 1 BCC 99563 (Eng.) (holding persistent defaults by an 
accountant in making necessary returns did not result in disqualification since there was no dishonesty). 
40 See Re Living Images Ltd [1996] BCC 112, (Eng.) (favoured the view that the evidence against 
a director ought to be overwhelming of the directors’ wrongdoing). 
41 Stephen Griffin, Standards of Proof Applicable to S 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, 18 CO. L. 24, 26 (1997); Amanda Hoey, Disqualifying Delinquent Directors, 18 CO. L. 130 
(1997). 
42 See AB Trucking and BAW Commercials (Ch D June 1987, Unreported) (holding respondent 
incapable of understanding the commercial reality of accounts and thus incapable of discharging his duty 
to the public. Harman J disqualified the respondent for four years for falling below an objective standard). 
See also Janet Dine, Disqualification of Company Directors, 9 CO. L. 213 (1988). 
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incompetence, recklessness, and being a danger to the public, by which to 
judge the conduct of directors.43 
Section 215 widens the scope within which one can be disqualified by 
extending liability to offences that are not in the Companies Act 2015. This 
follows the approach adopted by the Ghanaian Companies Code as well as 
the Singapore’s Companies Act, which provide for disqualification on the 
basis of conviction of any offence (not necessarily relating to a company) 
involving fraud or dishonesty.44 
Section 218(1) of the Companies Act 2015 allows for the 
disqualification of a director of a company that has at any time become 
insolvent and the conduct of the director makes him unfit to take part in the 
management of a company.45 Matters that might render a director unfit 
include: breach of fiduciary or other duty; any conduct giving rise to an 
obligation to account for money or other property of the company; failure to 
prepare financial statements and directors’ reports; failure to keep a register 
of members, directors, and secretaries; failure to keep proper accounting 
records; and submitting annual returns to the Registrar. 
Broadening the scope of disqualification to provide for disqualification 
arising from offences outside the Companies Act 2015 as well as breaches of 
duty when a company is a going concern has made the disqualification 
framework more of a deterrent, as directors can be disqualified on the basis 
of their unfitness to act in the management of companies. 
C. Filing Returns 
Under the Kenyan Companies Act 1962, failure of filing annual returns 
by a director made him liable to a fine,46 but it was not a ground for 
disqualification. Some commentators, however, felt that disqualifying 
directors for failure to file returns was desirable, as it could improve the level 
of compliance.47 This would, in turn, raise directors’ accountability to 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 See Dine, supra note 42. 
44 Companies Act 2017, c. 50, § 154 (Sing.). 
45 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 218(1). 
46 The Companies Act (1962) Cap. 486 § 125(3) (Kenya). 
47 Kiarie Mwaura, Disqualification of Company Directors in Kenya, 54 N. IR. LEGAL. Q. 118, 129 
(2003). 
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shareholders, as the latter would be able to keep track of the affairs of the 
company.48 
Section 217 of the Companies Act 2015 now provides for 
disqualification as a result of conviction for failure to file returns.49 For such 
an order to issue, the person needs to have been convicted for no fewer than 
three such offences within the five years ending with the date of the last 
conviction.50 This approach is similar to that of the United Kingdom51 and 
Australia,52 where courts can disqualify a director for up to five years for 
being in default of filing returns with the Registrar of Companies. However, 
the Kenyan approach is more similar to that of Australia, as it captures a 
scope that covers breaches of all companies’ legislation and those that go 
beyond.53 
III. ENFORCEMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 
The implementation of a disqualification framework would hardly be 
effective without reliable enforcement mechanisms. To satisfy the objectives 
of disqualification orders, Section 244 of the Companies Act 2015 makes a 
disqualified person who gets involved in the management personally in 
contravention of a disqualification order responsible for the relevant debts of 
a company incurred while he was so involved.54 
IV. THE LENGTH OF DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 
Section 189 of the Companies Act 1962 provided that a disqualified 
director was prevented from being involved in the management of companies 
for a period not exceeding five years.55 This was thought to have been less of 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 Id. 
49 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 217. 
50 Id. 
51 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, c. 46, § 3 (Eng.). 
52 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt I §§ 4, 10, 285 (Austl.). 
53 See The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 215(4). 
54 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 244. 
55 The Companies Act (1962) Cap. 486 § 189 (Kenya). 
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a deterrent than intended and proposals were made to lengthen the period of 
disqualification.56 
This was enhanced by the Companies Act 2015, which now provides 
for a maximum of five years imposed by magistrates and fifteen years by 
judges.57 This follows the approach adopted in other jurisdictions, such as 
Australia, that recognise the need for longer periods of disqualification. The 
Australian courts can disqualify a person from managing corporations for a 
period that the Court considers appropriate.58 Similarly, the United 
Kingdom’s CDDA imposes a minimum disqualification for unfitness of two 
years and a maximum of fifteen years.59 
V. LIMITED AND CONDITIONAL ORDERS 
Section 229 of the Companies Act 2015 enables a disqualified person to 
apply to court for permission to act in a way that would otherwise be a breach 
of the disqualification.60 This is a departure from the approach taken by the 
repealed Companies Act 1962, which did not have the same flexibility. In the 
old regime, the courts either imposed absolute disqualification orders or 
made no disqualification orders. 
Limited and conditional orders may be useful in instances where the 
courts feel that it may, for instance, be appropriate to disqualify a director 
from a public company and not a private one61 in order to safeguard national 
commercial interests.62 Therefore, where damage to the company is not 
apparent, conditional disqualification orders are useful because they allow 
the courts to balance the interests of the public, employees and the director 
in question and, in turn, promote enterprise and protect creditors at the same 
time. Thus, where the courts are reluctant to impose absolute disqualification 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 Mwaura, supra note 47, at 125. 
57 See The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 215(2). 
58 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2D pt 2D.6 ss 206C, 206E (Austl.). 
59 See Hicks, supra note 20, at 245 (assessing the appropriate length of the disqualification order, 
the court considers: the nature of the offence, whether it was closely connected with management, the 
nature of the person’s involvement in the offence, his general character and reputation, etc.). 
60 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 229. 
61 Hicks, supra note 33, at 42. 
62 Re Majestic Studios [1988], 4 BCC 519 (Eng.) (allowed a director to continue trading after a 
disqualification order on condition that he was accountable to an independent assessor. In so doing the 
court was able to save fifty jobs which were at risk). 
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due to their harsh consequences, they might be far more amenable to making 
limited and conditional orders.63 It is possible for the leave-to-act to be 
utilised as a limited disqualification order where a director is allowed to serve 
in certain capacities only.64 Similarly, Australian courts may impose such 
conditions or limitations as they think fit.65 Thus, the courts can protect 
creditors effectively by use of conditional orders rather than the far-reaching 
absolute disqualification orders. 
VI. UNDERTAKINGS 
Section 220(1) of the Companies Act 2015 allows the Attorney General 
to accept a disqualification undertaking by any person.66 In such 
circumstances, a director undertakes not to be involved in the management 
of companies for a specific period of time. The maximum period is fifteen 
years and the minimum is two years. This is a new development that was not 
catered for under the old regime. In view of delays in court proceedings, the 
undertakings are likely to help in decongesting the courts, as they enable 
disqualification proceedings to be settled out of court. Such undertakings 
have already been adopted in the United Kingdom, where the Insolvency Act 
2000 empowers the Secretary of State to accept the undertaking of a director 
without requiring him to admit the actual basis of disqualification. While 
such undertakings might be expedient and cheaper on the public purse, they 
                                                                                                                           
 
63 See Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 3 WLR 26 (Eng.) (a director was disqualified for a 
three-year period but permitted to remain as a director of two companies so long as a named qualified 
accountant remained a director of the company). See also Re Majestic Studios [1988] 4 BCC 519 (Eng.) 
(allowed a director to continue trading after a disqualification order on condition that he was accountable 
to an independent assessor. Such conditions are not different from the conditional orders given in other 
jurisdictions). See generally Hicks, supra note 20, at 247. 
64 See Hicks, supra note 20, at 247. 
65 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ch 2D pt 2D.6 ss 206G(1), 206G(2) (Austl.) (Section 206G(1) 
of the Corporations Act 2001 enables the courts to grant leave to manage “corporations, particular class 
of corporations or a particular corporation.” Under Section 206G(2) the court determines the conditions 
and exceptions to accompany the leave). See also Re Magna Alloys & Research Pty Ltd (1980) FCA 150 
(Austl.) (a person was given leave to take part in the management of three specified companies when their 
boards were controlled by independent non-executive directors). See also Re Leomond Properties Pty Ltd 
(1983) 1 ACLC 1370 (leave to be a director of seven companies was given following conviction for 
handling stolen crucifixes). See also Re Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 (Austl.) (a New 
Zealand court gave a person leave to be a manager of a specified company so long as he would not be 
signing cheques on behalf of the company). 
66 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 220(1). 
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might pose a problem in that directors might accept a period of 
disqualification to avoid the cost burden for defending disqualification 
proceedings.67 Besides, the Registrar might be tempted to accept 
undertakings so as to achieve the policy objective of disqualifying many 
directors.68 
VII. REGISTER OF DISQUALIFIED PERSONS 
Whilst Kenya had no provision for a register of disqualification orders 
under the old regime, Section 227 of the Companies Act 2015 now requires 
the Registrar to maintain a register of disqualification orders.69 Without a 
register, it was not possible to enforce disqualification orders adequately, a 
director could secretly continue to act without being noticed. The 
introduction of a register of disqualification orders follows trends in other 
commonwealth countries, such as Ghana,70 United Kingdom,71 and 
Australia,72 where the register is mandatory. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Under the Companies Act 1962, the disqualification framework failed 
significantly to deter directors who were tempted to engage in activities that 
were detrimental to the well-being of a company. The disqualification 
                                                                                                                           
 
67 See Adrian Walters, Directors Disqualification: The Vice-Chancellor’s Address to the Chancery 
Bar Association, 21 COMPANY LAW. 90 (2000). 
68 See Adrian Walters, Bare Undertakings in Directors Disqualification Proceedings: The 
Insolvency Act 2000, Blackspur and Beyond, 22 COMPANY LAW. 290, 297 (2001). 
69 The Companies Act, No. 17 (2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 158 § 227. 
70 Companies Code Act 179 of 1963 § 186(7) (Ghana) (“Where any order is made or leave is 
granted under this section the court making the order or granting leave shall forward a copy to the Registrar 
who shall cause a summary thereof to be published in the Gazette. The Registrar shall maintain a register 
of orders made under this section and shall enter thereon particulars of each order and any leave granted 
and such register shall be open to the inspection of any person.”). 
71 The UK Secretary of State maintains a register of disqualification orders. This was introduced in 
the UK by the Companies Act 1976, which is open to inspection free of charge. Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, § 18 (Eng.). Similar provisions exist in Australia. See Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth) § 1274AA (Austl.). The register can be inspected at Companies House in London within fourteen 
days of making a disqualification order. The court sends the particulars of the order to the Secretary of 
State for entry in the register. In addition, any variation and grant of leave to act must be communicated 
to the Secretary of State. S MAYSONET AL, COMPANY LAW, 727 (Blackstone, 17th ed. 2000). 
72 See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) § 1243 (Austl.) (requires the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission to keep a publicly available register of disqualified company directors). 
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framework only enabled a director to be disqualified on the basis of fraud 
when a company was a going concern. Thus, a director could not be 
disqualified on the basis of breach of duty, unfitness, and failing to file 
returns. A director could only be disqualified, under Section 189, for breach 
of duty when a company was in the course of winding up. This did little to 
raise the standards of the conduct of directors and to protect the public from 
miscreant directors. The Companies Act 2015 has broadened the scope of 
provisions, offences, and grounds for disqualification in order to prevent 
errant directors from finding their way to boardrooms. It is expected that 
these new developments shall be more protective of shareholders and 
creditors and shall, in turn, play a part in attracting more investors into the 
country. It, however, remains to be seen how efficiently these provisions will 
be enforced. 
